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SUMMARY
This paper reviews developments in both
environmental economics and ecological economics
with respect to their progress towards environmental
interdisciplinarity and towards providing solutions
to environmental problems. The concepts, methods,
theories and assumptions of each field of knowledge
are reviewed and the extent to which they depart from
the dominant neoclassical paradigm of economics
is assessed. The contribution that interdisciplinarity
has made to the success of each field is analysed in
terms of understanding, influence and effectiveness
and the constraints that it has imposed upon that
success. Environmental economics has adopted the
dominant economic neoclassical paradigm, including
the power of the market to allocate environmental
resources efficiently and in a socially optimal way. The
solution to environmental problems is thus seen as a
matter of ensuring that the environment is properly
priced to reflect the relative scarcity of natural
resources and assets and to ensure that environmental
values are incorporated into the market. This
specialized view of environmental problems is now
reflected in government policy around the world
including the use of extended cost benefit analyses,
contingent valuations, environmental charges and
emissions trading. Nevertheless, environmental
problems continue to grow in severity and the
solutions provided by environmental economists have
proven ineffective. Thus lack of interdisciplinarity
does not prevent a field of knowledge from gaining
influence and dominance, however its effectiveness
in terms of understanding environmental problems
and solving them is impeded. Ecological economics
seeks to incorporate the research of economists,
ecologists, philosophers and social scientists, however
its influence seems to be have been limited to
areas in which it retains the standard economics
framework, and this limits its effectiveness in terms
of environmental solutions. Thus interdisciplinarity
may increase understanding of the real world but
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it cannot overcome political and social barriers to
translating that understanding into the widespread
implementation of effective environmental measures.
Keywords: ecological economics, environmental economics,
environmental solutions, interdisciplinary progress, neoclas-
sical economics, political influence
INTRODUCTION
Environmental and resource economics were established as
sub-disciplines of economics after the second world war,
particularly in North American universities. They adopted
rather than critiqued the dominant neoclassical paradigm
of economics (Spash 1999, p. 414). Neoclassical economists
argue that the free-market system can attain the best possible
allocation of resources through individuals acting in their own
best interests and without government regulation.
Mainstream economic theory has tended to assume
that economic systems were independent of environmental
restraints and therefore these could be ignored. At best
environmental pollution was treated as an externality that
occurs when production or consumption by a firm or
consumer directly affects the welfare of another firm or
consumer and those causing the damage are not financially
accountable for it. Externalities, whilst examples of market
failure, were not considered to be significant flaws in
the market system, although Arthur Pigou had advocated
government intervention in the form of taxes and subsidies
to discourage externalities (Pearce 2002).
In the 1950s, a group of economists started to take the
environment more seriously. Resource economists sought to
develop models of how industries that relied on environmental
resources, such as fisheries, forestry and agriculture, could use
them in an efficient and optimal way (Spash 1999). Resources
for the Future (RFF) was established in 1952 following the
publication in the USA of the Paley Report about the potential
exhaustibility of resource (Pearce 2002).
Environmental economics emerged in the 1960s as public
concerns with environmental pollution grew. Limits to
markets due to the constraints of nature were recognized,
in particular the indivisibility of nature that inhibited the
allocation of property rights to many environmental benefits.
Economic modelling expanded to cover resource depletion
and pollution. The Journal of Environmental Economics
Environmental economics and ecological economics 141
and Management (JEEM) was established in 1974 and the
Association of Environmental and Resource Economists
(AERE) was established in the USA in 1979, with close
associations to RFF. For many years JEEM was the primary
academic outlet for environmental and resource economists as
mainstream economic journals rarely published their research.
The European Association of Environmental and Resource
Economists (EAERE) was not established until after the
second wave of environmentalism in 1991, and its journal
Environmental and Resource Economics (ERE) followed shortly
afterwards (Spash 1999).
The recognition of market limitations began to fade in
the 1980s. Today environmental economists believe in the
power of the market to allocate environmental resources
efficiently and in a socially optimal way, just as it does with
economic products. To achieve this, environmental goods,
services and amenities need to be given a price so that they
can be incorporated into the market. If people and firms are
charged real prices for using the environment, environmental
considerations will be incorporated into market decisions. The
solution to environmental problems is therefore to ensure
that the environment is properly priced to reflect the relative
scarcity of natural resources and assets.
The standard view taken by environmental economists was
outlined early on (Schelling 1983; Seneca & Taussig 1984;
Baumol & Oates 1988; Tietenberg 1988, 1990; Pearce et al.
1989; Stavins & Whitehead 1992). It was argued that
environmental degradation has resulted from the failure of
the market system to put any value on the environment, even
though the environment does serve economic functions and
provides economic and other benefits. Not all economists take
this view, but the neoclassical approach which embodies this
philosophy dominates research and teaching in environmental
economics (Rosewarne 1993).
Resource and environmental economists attempted to
include the environment into models of economic systems,
in terms of its supply of raw materials and as a receptacle
for waste materials. For them ‘the natural environment is
an important component of the economic system’ and they
sought ‘to treat the natural environment in the same way as
we treat labour and capital; that is, as an asset and a resource’
(Thampapillai 1991) and as commodities that can be bought,
sold, traded, saved and invested (Nadeau 2008). In this view,
environmental commodities are interchangeable with other
commodities rather than a serious constraint on economic
activity.
Mainstream economists take a very specific view of the
term ‘value’, which relates to the exchange value of a
commodity rather than any broader concept that might
include aesthetic, spiritual and ethical dimensions. When
environmental economists speak of valuing the environment,
they mean giving it a market price based on supply and demand
and individual preferences.
This paper will examine the extent to which this adoption
of the neoclassical economic paradigm by environmental
economics and the blindness of researchers to other
disciplinary views have affected the success of environmental
economics in terms of its understanding of real world
environmental problems, its political influence and its
environmental effectiveness. It will then consider efforts by
ecological economists to make the field more interdisciplinary,
the extent to which they have been successful in these




Environmental economists sought to incorporate environ-
mental factors into project appraisals by modifying cost
benefit analysis (CBA) to include environmental costs and
benefits. RFF was an early advocate of the inclusion of
environmental costs and benefits in CBA (Spash 1999; Pearce
2002). According to Pearce (2002), ‘Two of the triumphs
of environmental economics have been to emphasize the
incompleteness of appraisals that omit environmental change
and to develop the means of incorporating environmental
values into appraisal’.
CBA involves comparing aggregate benefits with aggregate
costs. It has been argued that CBA should be applied
to all private and public projects, because they all have
economic effects that are not priced in the market place, i.e.
‘externalities’. For environmental externalities to be included
in a CBA they have to be converted into monetary measures.
CBA, like the notion of weak sustainability (see below),
assumes that environmental ‘goods’ and human-made goods
are interchangeable and substitutable and what matters is the
aggregate.
By confining decisions to a comparison of costs and benefits,
not only are broader policy and political issues ignored,
but there is also an underlying assumption ‘that efficiency
in allocation is the criterion that society deems paramount
when making decision’ whereas ‘other criteria such as equity
and political acceptability may be of greater concern to
environmental policymakers’ and to the community (Cooper
& Hart 1992).
Neoclassical economists do not concern themselves with
moral, political and ethical concerns because they assume that
the market is an ethical system and that political decisions
should be made separately. They dismiss the idea that
aggregating costs and benefits clouds distributional and equity
issues of who gets the benefits and who suffers the losses, by
arguing that in theory those benefiting could compensate the
losers ensuring that no one is worse off (Pareto criterion)
(Pearce 2002). However, whether this actually happens is not
of concern to these economists who dismiss it as a political
question outside their field; what matters is that aggregate
benefits outweigh aggregate costs.
Similarly CBA tends to be used to avoid considering the
moral dimensions of a decision; it is efficiency that matters to
economists. The moral value of averting injury, saving life and
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ensuring healthy working conditions is normally ignored in a
CBA (Waring 1988). As a result of discounting future costs
and benefits in CBAs, future cancer cases are discounted so
that 100 cancer cases in 20 years are equivalent to 26 cancers
today (using a 7% discount rate) (Ackerman & Heinzerling
2004) and ‘one death next year counts for more than a billion
deaths in five hundred years’ (Shrader-Frechette 2002).
Normally, future costs and benefits are discounted because
it is assumed that they are not worth as much to people as
present costs and benefits, and that economic growth and
technological innovation will ensure that future generations
are better off. But discount rates based on individual private
preferences are inappropriate for societal decisions regarding
environmental protection. While discounting money may
make sense, discounting environmental values seems to be
an example of what Daly and Cobb (1989) called ‘misplaced
concreteness’: in other words, getting mixed up between
the measure (in this case, money) and the real world (the
environment), and assuming that the real world behaves as
the measure does. Just because people would rather have
money now than later, so they can invest it or to be sure
of having it, this does not mean that they will value the
maintenance of an area of environmental significance less
each year into the future.
Economists lack the ecological knowledge to realize that
individual CBAs are unable to take into account the cumulative
loss of many small decisions in many communities. Over time
these could in fact destroy ecosystems, cause extinctions of
species and threaten human survival. Ecological systems are
not like economic systems where trends can be plotted in
smooth continuous lines. Rather, such systems may be able to
withstand many small assaults and then collapse suddenly once
a threshold is crossed. Scientists are often unable to identify
such thresholds, but it makes little sense for economists to
ignore them (Pearce 1994).
Putting a price on the environment
Environmental economists differentiate between different
types of environmental values. ‘User’ values cover benefits that
individuals get from the environment, including those from
recreation, sport, or just viewing pleasure. ‘Option’ values
are potential user values, namely the value to a person who
might use the environment in the future. ‘Existence’ values
are people’s preferences that are outside ‘use’ values, such
things as ‘concern for, sympathy with and respect for the
rights or welfare of non-human beings’ (Pearce et al. 1989).
The economist’s notion of ‘existence’ or ‘intrinsic’ values is
different from the environmentalist’s idea of intrinsic values,
which are values that the environment might have quite apart
from their value to humans.
For most economists, the environment can be priced
because option and existence values can be translated into the
preferences of individuals and those preferences in turn can
be measured. Individual preferences are often derived from
surveys, for example ‘contingent valuation’. These surveys
may ask people how much they are willing to pay to preserve
or improve the environment (willingness to pay) or how much
monetary compensation a person is willing to accept for loss
of environmental amenity (willingness to sell).
However, individual preferences are shaped to a large extent
by the information available to people about the consequences
of their choices, and that information is usually partial, often
distorted and mostly shaped by the media. Those surveyed
may think a wetland area is unattractive and worthless and
will be unwilling to pay to protect it, even though the
wetland has important ecological value of which they are
unaware. Contingent valuation surveys only take account of
the functions of parts of an ecosystem to the extent that the
people surveyed are knowledgeable about them.
Economists assume that individuals act to optimize their
own interests; this is the principle behind the market system
and ‘the intelligent pursuit of private gain’ is the essence of
rationality (Daly & Cobb 1989). They do not consider altruistic
behaviour as rational. The idea that markets are more efficient
at giving people what they want than governments is based
on the dubious assumption that there is no such thing as the
common good outside of individual wants and preferences.
However this ignores interdisciplinary knowledge about
people’s motivations and political behaviour. When people
vote they often see themselves as part of a group, be it an
occupational group, an ethnic group, a class, a nation or
whatever. In politics, people are not only concerned about
their self-interest, they also consider the ‘good of society’ (Self
1990, p. 9). This is why people support ideas such as public
education when they do not have children, and environmental
protection beyond their own lifetimes. ‘As consumers they
seek to maximise their own materialistic wants, whilst as
citizens they are concerned with what constitutes a ‘good’
society’’ (Cooper & Hart 1992, p. 22).
Contingent valuation and other methods of finding a price
for parts of the environment are completely human-centred
(anthropocentric) and take no account of the preferences of
other living creatures. This, economists believe, is as it should
be. For them value is defined in terms of exchange between
humans. For many environmentalists, however, especially
deep ecologists, this is unacceptable and arrogant. It denies
other living things any intrinsic value, namely any value
outside of their value to humans.
Ultimately, efforts to put a monetary value on the
environment are based on the assumed substitutability of
nature. Attaching a dollar value to a species still does not
guarantee its survival, a study done by a mathematician in
1973 showing that ‘it was economically preferable to kill every
blue whale left in the oceans as fast as possible and reinvest the
profits in growth industries rather than to wait for the species
to recover to the point where it could sustain an annual catch’
(Ehrenfeld 1988).
Weak sustainability and substitutability
For most economists, economic growth is necessary; they
believe that economic systems must grow if they are to survive.
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Since the environment was now viewed as part of the economic
system, providing services for it, then any measure of the
economy should include some measure of natural capital. This
implied the need to modify national accounts to take account of
depreciation of natural capital and environmental economists
sought to find ways to do this (Pearce 2002).
Environmental economists interpreted sustainable
development as development that maintains capital for
future generations where capital is the total of human
capital (skills, knowledge and technology) and human-made
capital (such as buildings and machinery), as well as natural
capital (environmental goods). This view is referred to
as weak sustainability, based on work by Robert Solow
(1974), which argued that the requirement to keep the total
amount of capital constant ‘is consistent with ‘running down’
natural capital—i.e. with environmental degradation’ because
human-made capital can be substituted for natural capital.
This means that the Amazon forest can be removed so long
as the proceeds from removing it ‘are reinvested to build up
some other form of capital’ (Pearce 1991).
This assumes that a community can continue to use up
its natural resources and degrade its natural environment
just as long as it is increasing its wealth and infrastructure
by an equivalent economic value. The fact that a region is
becoming a more sterile, artificial and dangerous place in
which to live is supposedly compensated for by the comforts
and entertainments that residents are able to buy.
Weak sustainability provides a rationale for continuing
to use non-renewable resources at ever-increasing rates.
Economists claim that, although there may be temporary
shortages, rising prices will ensure that new reserves will
be found, substitutes discovered and more efficient use
encouraged. What should remain constant is not the stocks
of non-renewable resources, but the economic value of the
stock (Pearce et al. 1989).
However, this principle requires that ‘environmental assets
be valued in the same way as man-made assets, otherwise
we cannot know if we are on a ‘sustainable development
path’’ (Pearce 1991, p. 2). Some environmental assets could
not be ‘traded-off’ because they are essential for life-support
systems and as yet they cannot be replaced, but valuation
would generally allow trade-offs between the environment
and wealth creation (Pearce 1991).
The weak sustainability view demonstrates a lack of
knowledge of ecological concepts and biological processes
that a more interdisciplinary approach would provide.
There are many types of environmental assets for which
there are no substitutes: for example, the ozone layer,
the climate-regulating functions of ocean phytoplankton,
the watershed protection functions of tropical forests, the
pollution-cleaning and nutrient-trap functions of wetlands.
There is little evidence that environmental economists
draw on the knowledge of ecologists or other scientists to
determine the limits of substitution. Nor that they take
seriously the uncertainties associated with these scientific
fields.
Weak sustainability also demonstrates a narrow economic
view of environmental quality as something that can be
swapped for other goods without a loss of welfare, that is
the substitutability of environmental quality (Goodin 1994).
Internalizing environmental costs
Environmental economists argue that external costs and
benefits should be ‘internalized’ by adjusting prices so that
the person buying the goods or services causing the external
cost is obliged to pay for it (Beder 1996; Nadeau 2008). This
can be done by means of a tax or charge, for example, a firm
discharging waste into a river might be charged a fee to cover
the cost of lost recreational amenity and fish life, thus making
external costs part of the polluter’s decision.
Laws can also force the polluter to take notice of these
external costs by prescribing limits to what can be discharged
or emitted, but environmental economists prefer the market to
perform this function: ‘Advocacy of environmental taxation
has been one of the hallmarks of environmental economics’
(Pearce 2002). This preference for market solutions is
ideologically based. ‘Its first pillar comes squarely out of a
philosophical tradition that grew from Adam Smith’s notion
that individual pursuit of self-interest would, in a regime
of competitive markets, maximise the social good. That
tradition is so firmly embedded in economics by now that
most economists probably do not realize, unless they venture
out into the world of noneconomists, that it is a proposition
of moral philosophy’ (Kelman 1983).
The rhetoric of internalization reinforces the premise that
the central environmental problem is the failure to ‘value’
the environment and that markets can adequately deal with
this problem when environmental costs are incorporated into
market prices through mechanisms such as fees, charges and
taxes.
Environmental economists argue that the market is able to
find the optimal level of environmental damage, that is, the
one that is most economically efficient (Beder 1996; Pearce
2002). The optimal level of pollution is the level at which
the costs to the company of cleaning up the pollution equal the
cost of environmental damage caused by that pollution. If the
pollution charge is equivalent to the cost of environmental
damage then the theory is that the company will clean up its
pollution until any further incremental reduction in pollution
would cost more than the remaining charge, that is, until it
is cheaper to pay the charge than reduce the pollution. This
is said to be economically efficient because if the polluter
spends any more than this, the costs to the firm of extra
pollution control will outweigh the benefits to those suffering
the adverse affects of the pollution.
This might seem to be a less than optimal goal to the
community but economists argue that the polluter is better
off than if it had paid to eliminate the pollution altogether and
the community is no worse off because it is being compensated
by the firm for the damage through the payments of the tax
or charge to the government (Beder 1996). In theory the
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payments can be used to correct the environmental damage
they cause.
This is where theory and reality diverge and where
economists’ lack of interdisciplinary knowledge becomes
evident because there is considerable doubt about whether
money payments can correct environmental damage in many
circumstances. Economists argue that if the money is spent
on something equally worthwhile then the community is still
no worse off, a view that those who suffer from the pollution
might find hard to accept. This also assumes that the benefits
that arise from the environment can be substituted for by
products and services bought in the market. The assumption
in internalizing the costs is that environmental damage can
be paid for and that this is as good as, or even preferable, to
avoiding the damage in the first place (Beder 1996).
All this supposes that the charges are in some way
equivalent to the damage done, but this is seldom the
case. Even where environmental taxes do not internalize
the full cost of environmental damage, they are favoured
by environmental economists because they are believed to
stimulate technological change and provide an incentive for
polluters to reduce their emissions: ‘For any tax rate, each
polluter will abate pollution up to the point where his marginal
abatement costs just equal the tax’ (Pearce 2002). This belief
stands without any examination of the real world behaviour
of companies in the face of increased taxes.
The assumption here is one that rests on economic
determinism, that is, given the right economic conditions
the desirable technological change will automatically occur.
This demonstrates a lack of knowledge of mechanisms and
drivers of technological change that a more interdisciplinary
approach might afford. It ignores the social and political
factors that shape technology and which have been the basis for
so much scholarship in the academic discipline of science and
technology studies (Bijker et al. 1987; MacKenzie & Wajcman
1985). Adding costs to a firm’s operations may impose pressure
on it to reduce its costs, but there is no guarantee that it
will do so in the area where the cost is imposed (Rosenberg
1976, chapter 23). It may find it easier, cheaper, or even more
profitable to apply new technology and methods in other parts
of its operation, or simply pass the increased cost on to the
consumer, especially in oligopolistic sectors (Beder 2006).
The degree of incentive provided will also obviously depend
on how large the charge or tax or subsidy is: ‘if it is low, and
environmental improvement is primarily achieved through
major investments in plant and equipment which occur rarely,
there may be little effect’ (M. Jacobs, unpublished paper 1993).
The need to own the environment
The market does not deal very well with resources that are
not individually owned, such as the atmosphere, waterways
and some areas of land. These are called public or social goods
by economists. Many environmental economists argue that
because the commons is not privately owned and access is
open, there is a tendency to overuse it, this is referred to as
the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 1968).
Legal sanctions in the form of environmental laws and
regulations are the modern way of preventing ‘tragedy of
the commons’ situations. Economists prefer to incorporate
the commons into the market system through the use of
economic instruments that create artificial property rights.
They believe this ensures that public goods are allocated in
a more ‘efficient’ manner. ‘Coase claimed that the primary
reason the mechanisms of market processes cannot resolve
environmental problems is that many environmental resources
are not owned and . . . the most effective way to internalize
negative environmental externalities was to revise the legal
system to allow for the assignment of ownership rights to
environmental resources. If these resources were owned,
argued Coase, the invisible hand would eliminate undesirable
uses and adverse environmental impacts would disappear
without the need for government intervention.’ (Nadeau
2008).
Rights-based economic instruments create ownership or
property rights ‘to use environmental resources, or to pollute
the environment, up to a pre-determined limit’, and allow
these rights to be traded (Commonwealth Government of
Australia 1990). They include emissions trading where the
right to discharge a certain amount of pollution is allocated
to individual firms, sometimes for a price, and markets are
set up to allow those rights to be bought and sold. Firms that
can reduce their pollution more cheaply than others can sell
their excess rights to firms for whom it would be expensive
to reduce their pollution. In this way, economists argue, a
given level of air quality can be achieved more efficiently with
a lower aggregate cost to the firms involved (Stavins 1989;
Beder 2006).
Emissions trading schemes aim to maximize economic
efficiency rather than environmental effectiveness, that is, they
aim to achieve a given level of environmental protection at least
cost to industry, and to enable continued economic growth
despite restrictions on air pollution. If substantial pollution
reductions are necessary then more expensive reductions also
have to be made and there is little point in setting up markets
that enable some firms to avoid making those expensive
reductions so as to minimize overall costs. In other words,
the more rigorous the emission reduction required, the less
scope there is to find cheap solutions and trade excess emission
allowances.
Market-based environmental policies are an indirect
method of achieving environmental goals. They are aimed
at altering conditions in which decisions are made rather than
directly prescribing actions. However regulators cannot be
sure that the changed conditions will bring about the desired
decisions. In practice, the benefits of economic instruments
are far more theoretical than real. The use of emissions trading
has not led to significant environmental quality improvements
(Beder 2006).
The faith of environmental economists in market
mechanisms shows a lack of knowledge of the mechanisms and
drivers of technological change that a more interdisciplinary
approach would provide. Their assumption that financial
incentives are all that is required to change behaviour
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in a particular way is naïve and simplistic. The market
often favours technologies that are cheapest in the short
term, such as capturing end-of-pipe emissions from an
existing facility, even though more capital-expensive options
such as renewable energy projects have broader benefits
and can be more economical in the long term (Lohmann
2004). Substantial changes to technological paradigms require
institutional changes that decision-makers prefer to avoid.
It is usually cheaper to retrofit old plants than switch to
cleaner technologies. By allowing firms to pay for pollution,
technological innovation is stifled rather than encouraged
(Beder 2006). For example, an electricity supplier can pay less
to offset its emissions by planting trees in a developing nation
than it would cost to reduce its own emissions (Driesen 1998).
Success of environmental economics
Rather than being an interdisciplinary expansion of the
discipline of economics, environmental economics has
adopted the theory, assumptions and paradigms of neoclassical
economics and applied them to incorporate environmental
problems into economic analysis. Given the workings of
the market in reality, and the well-elaborated imperfections
and problems associated with it, what is surprising
is that neoclassical economics has not only dominated
environmental economics but has also increasingly dominated
the whole public discussion of sustainable development and
environmental policy.
Environmental economics has been enormously influential.
As well as being taught in universities, it is ‘practised in
government agencies and development banks’ (Nadeau 2008).
The discussion surrounding sustainable development borrows
heavily from the language and concepts of environmental
economics. Sustainable development policies around the
world call for environmental assets to be appropriately
valued, implying that putting a price on the environment
will help protect it, that the ‘free’ market is the best way
of allocating environmental resources, and that businesses
should base their decisions about polluting behaviour on
economic considerations and the quest for profit.
Much of the discussion of sustainable development
describes nature and the environment in economic terms,
as natural resources or natural capital, and as part of the
community’s stock of assets. Even the term ‘value’ has been
usurped by economists. In the 1980s, the Oxford English
Dictionary began listing its principal meaning in economic
terms: ‘that amount of some commodity, medium of exchange,
etc., which is considered to be an equivalent for something
else; a fair or adequate equivalent or return’ (Waring 1988).
Environmental groups have found it necessary to employ
their own economists in order to be heard in an increasingly
economics-dominated environmental policy arena and they
have taken advice from those economists (Rosewarne 1993).
Contingent valuation is routinely used by government
agencies and departments in more than 40 nations, as well as
by the World Bank, to value environmental goods and services
(Nadeau 2008). In particular, legislation and court assessments
in the USA have encouraged the use of contingent valuation
(Pearce 2002).
Environmental taxes and charges are now used extensively
in OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development) nations and are spreading to developing nations
(Pearce 2002). Tradeable environmental property rights
are used for air pollutants, fisheries, water allocation and
water pollutants, as well as biodiversity banks (Beder 2006).
Emissions trading is increasingly being used as the main policy
measure to reduce regional and global pollution. (Drury et al.
1999) Emissions trading is used in Chile, Canada, Australia,
Europe and the USA (Robinson & Ryan 2002).
The environmental economist’s view that environmental
degradation is caused by a failure to ‘value’ the environment
and a lack of properly defined property rights not only
forestalls criticism of the market system, but in fact promotes
an extension of markets as the only way to solve the
problem. Within the market framework ‘issues of ‘capitalist
development’ and ‘ecological sustainability’ have tended to
congeal around the theme of environmental costs and how
best to reduce these. The social relations of the market itself
are not brought into question; the solution is not seen as
involving a major social transformation or radical economic
restructuring’ (White 1992).
By focusing on policy measures that leave the existing
market unchanged, environmental issues remain subordinate
to economic interests and the logic of the system, which is
based on unlimited economic growth, is left unchallenged
(White 1992, p. 150).
The renewed push for the use of economic instruments in
the 1980s was due in part to the influence of the ideology of
neoliberalism in many Western governments with its advocacy
of deregulation and privatization (Steiner 1992). Economic
instruments make a virtue out of the profit motive and the
pursuit of self-interest, whereas those arguing for a new
environmental ethic took the traditional approach of trying
to combat self-interest through morality (Beder 1996).
The promotion of market-based instruments was a way of
resurrecting the role of the market in the face of environmental
failure. Advocates claimed that market instruments provided
a way that the power of the market could be harnessed to
environmental goals (Stavins 1989; Tietenberg 1990). They
served a political purpose in that they reinforced the role
of the ‘free market’ at a time when environmentalism most
threatened it.
Environmental economists sought to enrol industry
by emphasizing the flexibility of market-based economic
instruments: they give firms a choice and allow them to make
their own decisions. They juxtaposed economic instruments
with legislative instruments which dictated how firms should
behave, legislative instruments being termed ‘command-and-
control’: ‘market-based incentives provide freedom of choice
for businesses and consumers to determine the best way to
reduce pollution’ (Stavins & Whitehead 1992). Additionally,
environmental taxes and charges were promoted as a way
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of replacing other charges and taxes that firms would
normally have to pay anyway (Repetto et al. 1992; M. Jacobs,
unpublished paper 1993).
As public pressure mounted to toughen regulation, the
argument for market instruments became more compelling.
Industry preferred to retain the choice of discharging wastes
into the environment, even if it had to pay for the privilege.
Charges made the costs explicit and placed a ceiling on them
(Repetto et al. 1992), whereas legislation had the potential to
impose clean-up costs of unknown magnitudes.
Many bureaucrats and politicians were attracted to the idea
of economic instruments by the economists’ promise that
they would remove decision-making from the public arena,
thereby depoliticizing environmental debates (Beder 1996).
Environmental controversy can be politically damaging and
can interfere with the bureaucratic decision-making process.
Chant et al. (1990) argued that market-based instruments
transform environmental conflicts from political problems
to economic transactions. ‘A major advantage of the market
as an allocational device is that it provides a non-political
solution to the social conflict raised by resource scarcity’
(Chant et al. 1990).
If the market could be used to allocate environmental
resources on the basis of supply and demand, just as other
choices are made (such as between growing wool or wheat
on a farm), environmental economists believed they could be
removed from the political arena (Bennett 1991).
Nevertheless, despite the success of environmental
economists in having their proposed policies widely adopted,
environmental problems continue to grow in severity. This
underscores the fact that a lack of interdisciplinarity does not
prevent the success of a field of knowledge in terms of influence
and dominance, however it does prevent its effectiveness in
terms of understanding environmental problems and how to
solve them.
ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS
The International Society for Ecological Economics (ISEE)
was established in 1987 and national branches followed in the
USA, Australia/New Zealand, Brazil, Canada, Europe, India,
Russia and elsewhere (Spash 1999). The key people behind
the establishment of ecological economics were economists
Herman Daly and Joan Martinez-Alier, zoologist AnnMari
Jansson and one of her students Robert Costanza; ‘They were
the main initiators behind the first meetings and publications,
and the journal’ (Ropke 2004). According to Spash (1999),
ecological economics was a way of bringing economists and
ecologists together: ‘in the introduction to the first issue of
the journal Ecological Economics, Bob Costanza stated that
the subject would extend the overlap between neo-classical
environmental economics and ecological impact studies and
encourage new ways of thinking about linkages between
ecological and economic systems’.
However, the journal Ecological Economics (EE), which
commenced publication in 1989, covered a wide variety of
research topics and tended to be more pluralistic in its
approach than these early indications (Ropke 2005). EE is
concerned with ‘the relationship between the economic and
the ecological system, and its underlying central aim is to
provide knowledge for a sustainable management of this
relationship’ (Baumgärtner et al. 2008).
The popularity of ecological economics was evidenced by
large attendance at its conferences beginning in 1990, the first
ISEE conference in Washington attracted 370 people, and the
second in Stockholm more than 450 people (Ropke 2005).
Ecological constraints and equity
What differentiated ecological economics from environmental
economics was that ecological economists generally
recognized that ‘the Earth is materially finite and nongrowing’
with the economy ‘a subset of this finite global system’
(Costanza et al. 2007). Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen had
already claimed thermodynamics and energy availability
limited economic growth and Herman Daly had advocated
a steady-state economy (Nadeau 2008). For ecological
economists, the economic system is a component of the
ecological system rather than environmental inputs and
outputs being components of the economic system (Costanza
et al. 2007).
Ecological economists are far more willing than
environmental economists to recognize that there are physical
limits to the material growth of economies that may already
have been reached. Environmental economists tend to have
more faith in the ability of technology to overcome problems
of resource scarcity and loss of ecosystem services, given the
right price signals (Ropke 2005; Costanza et al. 2007).
Emerging from this recognition of physical limits there has
been a focus in ecological economics on the idea of ecological
footprints and how to measure them (Ropke 2005). The
notion of ecological footprints makes explicit equity concerns,
which is another area of difference between environmental
and ecological economists. They do this by demonstrating
that affluent nations have much larger footprints, particularly
per person, and are therefore using more than their fair share
of resources (Rees 1996).
Ecological economists are willing to explicitly consider
ethical and philosophical issues, such as intergenerational
and intragenerational equity, and even, in some cases, to
recognize non-human values (Ropke 2005, p. 267; Spash 1993,
p. 427). For example, Daly sought to expand the goals of
an economic system from efficient allocation to also include
equitable distribution as well as sustainable scale (cited in
Nadeau 2008).
Issues of equity and scale cannot be accommodated within
a neoclassical economic paradigm with its emphasis on
individual preferences (Nadeau 2008). This has led many
ecological economists to move away from the economist’s
reliance on individual preferences as the arbiter of all value and
to recognise the value of social and community values (Spash
1993) as well as the social and cultural context for the economy
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(Ropke 2005). It has also led to attempts to incorporate social,
political and ethical considerations into economic analysis
(Spash 1999) rather than, as environmental economists do,
leaving such matters for politicians to deal with or, in the case
of neoclassical economists, assuming that the market should
be the final arbiter of ethical decisions. Further, it means that
efficiency can no longer be the dominant decision-making
determinant (Spash 1993).
The European Society for Ecological Economics (ESEE),
established in 1996, has tended to take a more socioeconomic
and political economy approach than its USA counterpart; it
has encouraged ‘cooperation with philosophers, sociologists
and psychologists to explore ethical, social and behavioural
fundamentals of human well-being’ (Spash 1999).
Environmental valuation
Like environmental economics, ecological economics is
however still obsessed with environmental valuation and its
measurement, though not always in monetary terms (Gómez-
Baggethun, et al. 2010). Nadeau (2008) argued that ecological
economists’ primary objective ‘is to enlarge the framework of
the neoclassical economic paradigm to include scientifically
valid measures of the environmental costs of economic
activities’.
Even before the ISEE was formed economists and ecologists
had worked together to persuade international agencies to
modify national accounting systems to include environmental
factors (Costanza et al. 2007). Changing national accounts to
reflect environmental degradation and associated costs is still
a major project of ecological economics (Repetto 1989).
The most commonly used aspect of national accounting
is the gross national product (GNP). Various modifications
to GNP have been proposed over the years as a way of
incorporating social and environmental factors. However,
in order for the environment to be integrated into national
accounts it has to be valued in monetary terms. What is more,
an adjusted GNP figure is merely a way of measuring weak
sustainability. It assumes that as long as total capital, including
natural capital, is increasing then welfare is increasing, a
position taken by environmental economists that allows for the
gradual deterioration of the environment (Beder 2006). The
integration of environmental values into national accounts
assumes that environmental ‘goods’ and human-made goods
are interchangeable and that what matters is the aggregate;
that environmental goods can be indefinitely traded off for
human-made goods.
Many ecological economists, however, do emphasize the
need for ‘strong sustainability’ (see above) with its rejection
of the idea that natural capital is substitutable, though not
entirely so (Pearce 2002). This does not, however, stop them
focusing on the need to measure the economic value of nature.
In a special issue of Ecological Economics on biodiversity
and policy, biodiversity was framed as ‘a scarce economic
good, for which however a (proper) pricing system does not
exist’ and while it was acknowledged there is no framework
for doing this adequately, it was argued that ‘economic
valuation of biodiversity is a pressing issue and the number of
studies concerning monetary biodiversity evaluation is quickly
growing’ (Nunes & Nijkamp 2008). Nunes and Nijkamp
(2008) claimed the importance of valuationwas to enable direct
comparison in cost-benefit studies and to enable economists
to assess environmental damage and benefits, as well as
individual consumer motivations and opinions of biodiversity
conservation.
In the same Ecological Economics issue, papers looked at
the role of financial compensation for voluntary conservation
measures; ways to measure biodiversity improvement and its
cost; measurement of the value of conservation of genetic
biodiversity for research and development; the cost of human
health impacts of vulture decline in India; and contingent
valuation of a nature protection programme. All demonstrated
a focus on economic measurement of value, despite the
recognition that ecological values, which involve maintenance
and support for ecological systems, are not captured by
economic valuation (Nijkamp et al. 2008).
Within ecological economics, another area of controversy
related to valuation is the issue of incommensurability, which
questions whether all value can be expressed in common units
of measurement such as money. Whilst some attempt to price
the environment and biodiversity in monetary terms, others
insist on complementary measures and multi-criteria based
decision processes (Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010).
Ecosystem services
According to ecological economists, the concept of ecosystem
services popularized by Daily (1997) and Costanza et al. (1997)
was originally supposed to be a way of communicating the
idea of ‘nature as a fixed stock of capital that can sustain a
limited flow of ecosystem services’, but which cannot sustain
unlimited economic growth (Norgaard 2010). The term was
used to raise awareness of how dependent humans are on
healthy ecosystems, however over time it became a dominant
paradigm for approaching environmental management and
policy. There has been an ‘exponential rise in the use of
the term ‘ecosystem services’ in academic journals’ and an
‘industry of professionals providing advice on ecosystem
services’ has flourished (Norgaard 2010).
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) defined
ecosystem services as including provisioning services (such
as food, water, fibre and fuel), regulating services (such as
carbon sinks, flood mitigation and waste treatment), cultural
services (for example spiritual values, aesthetic pleasure and
recreation) and support services (for example soil formation
and nutrient recycling) (cited in Kosoy & Corbera 2010;
Norgaard 2010). This was not so different from the efforts
of environmental economists to translate environmental
considerations into inputs and outputs for the economic
system which fitted the neoclassical economic paradigm so
well.
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The growing popularity of ecosystem services has
reinstated economic growth as a desirable and attainable goal
amongst ecological economists (Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010;
Norgaard 2010). Ecosystem services, according to economic
logic, represent the provision of services by natural capital
to the economy, as well as the existence of externalities not
included in market transactions. To be maintained, ecosystem
services have to be paid for, thus introducing the concept of
payments for ecosystem services (PES), whereby landowners
and managers would be paid to conserve ecosystems on their
property, and markets for ecosystem services (MES), which
include emissions trading and wetland mitigation banking.
Increasingly ecosystem services are seen as ‘commodities on
potential markets’ (Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010).
Some have viewed ecosystem services as interdisciplinary
progress, whereby economists and ecologists have combined
their knowledge bases to expand understanding of the
economy/ecology interrelationship (Reyers et al. 2010),
however the concept is likely to narrow the way that ecologists
understand ecosystems (Norgaard 2010). Ecosystems may
come to be considered principally in terms of stocks and flows
rather than ‘in terms of population dynamics, food webs,
energy flows, interactive behaviors, biogeochemical cycles,
spatial organization across landscapes, and co-evolutionary
processes’ (Norgaard 2010, pp. 1220–2). Increasingly research
funding may then go to researchers engaged in this type of
ecological thinking and this might greatly ‘reduce scientific
and public understanding of the true complexities of
ecosystems’ and ‘lead to narrow management and future crises’
(Norgaard 2010).
Some economists also believe that an emphasis on
ecosystem services will narrow the way the logic and dynamic
of economic systems is understood.
The ecosystem approach tends to encourage a project-
by-project analysis of ecosystems where it is assumed that
the system as a whole (economy and planetary) remains
in equilibrium, unaffected by local impacts, thus ignoring
cumulative effects. It ignores the vital role of institutions in
supporting sustainability and the way institutions vary from
region to region (Norgaard 2010).
The neglect of the working of ecological systems and also
institutional and governance systems in which projects take
place have ensured that an ecosystem services approach skews
ecology to inform markets rather than informing governance
(Norgaard 2010). For example wetland mitigation banks
assume that the value of a wetland can be estimated in terms
of acreage and that a wetland in one place is equivalent to a
wetland in another watershed, even though wetlands perform
specific functions for the surrounding ecosystem (Beder 2006).
Viewing forests as providing ecosystem services such as
carbon sinks has led to the growth of plantations without
regard to their impact on local water supplies, biodiversity
and the livelihoods of local people (Beder 2006, pp. 189–90).
What is more, the institutional problems associated with
deforestation are ignored in efforts to establish these biocarbon
stocks (Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010).
Moreover, the commodification of ecosystem services into
markets ensures that they are viewed as exchangeable and
therefore substitutable. It fits with the neoclassical economic
paradigm of the need to price services provided by the
environment, assign property rights and create markets where
those rights can be exchanged so that the market can ensure
the most efficient allocation of these scarce resources and
services through the mechanism of individuals pursuing their
individual self-interest (Kosoy & Corbera 2010).
Gómez-Baggethun et al. (2010) pointed out that policies
that are based on financial incentives endorse the idea that
acting in personal self interest is an appropriate response but
this can undermine the encouragement of a conservation ethic.
Consequently market-based mechanisms shift the motivation
for conservation from the realm of morality and communal
obligation to that of economic self-interest.
Neoclassical takeover?
All these criticisms of ecosystem services and economic
valuation can be found in the ecological economic literature.
But does this mean that ecological economics has achieved true
interdisciplinarity? Or is the dominant neoclassical paradigm
of economics gradually taking over ecological economics, as it
has taken over policy agendas?
Ecological economics is interdisciplinary in that it involves
the cooperation of people from different scientific disciplines
(Baumgärtner et al. 2008). Interdisciplinary research can
involve the coordination of work from different disciplines,
each with their own set of concepts, methods and theories,
which are brought together, integrated and analysed to reach
conclusions. Interdisciplinary research may, however, go
further, and involve some effort to adjust and share concepts,
methods and theories to achieve interdisciplinary objectives
(Baumgärtner et al. 2008).
In contrast, multidisciplinary projects involve people from
different disciplines contributing their research results, but
they do not cooperate in undertaking their research and
there is no attempt to synthesize results. Pluridisciplinary
research may involve some cooperation between researchers
from different disciplines in undertaking research, but no
coordination of research or synthesis of results (Max-Neef
2005).
The founders of ecological economics argue that, rather
than creating a new disciplinary ‘paradigm based in shared
assumptions and theory’, ecological economics ‘represents a
commitment among economists, ecologists, and others, both
as academics and as practitioners, to learn from each other, to
explore new patterns of thinking together, and to facilitate
the derivation and implementation of new economic and
environmental policies’ (Costanza et al. 2007).
How much learning and integration of concepts has really
occurred? As ecological economics grew in popularity and
academic profile, more neoclassical economists were attracted,
particularly as economics journals became more difficult
to publish in (Ropke 2005). At the same time, ecological
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economists were not accepted within mainstream economics,
‘their work has been routinely dismissed or ignored by
mainstream economists’ (Nadeau 2008).
Ecological economics may be seen as ‘methodologically
pluralistic’, accepting the analytical framework of neoclassical
economics among others. (Constanza et al. 2007). For
example, the Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics, which
developed and championed the idea of ecosystem services in
the early 1990s (Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010), embraced
neoclassical economics and brought together mainstream
economists and ecologists to model interactions between
ecological and economic systems (Ropke 2005).
The acceptance of neoclassical economics within ecological
economics, despite its alien assumptions about substitutability
and commensurability and the place of ethical considerations,
and its refusal to acknowledge ecological limits, indicates
that ecological economics is more multidisciplinary than
interdisciplinary. In fact, in the light of developments in the
field of ecosystem services, it seems likely that the prospects
of interdisciplinarity are receding rather than increasing.
CONCLUSION
Environmental economists have successfully propagated the
economic definition of environmental problems, namely
that they are caused by a failure to properly price the
environment and provide financial incentives to protect
it. This approach is now reflected in government policy
around the world. Nevertheless, environmental problems
continue to grow in severity and the solutions provided by
environmental economists have proven to be ineffective. Lack
of interdisciplinarity does not prevent the success of a field
of knowledge in terms of influence and dominance, however
it does impede its effectiveness in terms of understanding
environmental problems and how to solve them.
Ecological economics seeks a more interdisciplinary
approach, incorporating the research of economists,
ecologists, philosophers and social scientists. However, the
success of ecological economics in terms of influence seems
to be have been limited to areas where it retains the
standard economics view of environmental problems (for
example ecosystem services), which limits its contribution to
effective environmental solutions. Interdisciplinarity, whilst
increasing understanding of the real world, has been unable
to overcome political and social barriers to translating
that understanding into the widespread implementation of
effective environmental measures.
While many academics seek interdisciplinarity in their
research, the same cannot be said of government ministries,
departments and agencies, which are generally divided into
specialized domains dealing with stakeholders from particular
sectors of the economy. Such stakeholders have a vested
interest in avoiding government imposed costs, even if they
are imposing environmental burdens on others.
Knowledge alone, no matter how refined and compre-
hensive, is insufficient to overcome the power of vested
interests. It is doubtful that environmental problems can be
solved whilst they continue to be defined in economic terms,
yet changing the definition of environmental problems will
require more than a broadening of knowledge bases. It will
require a challenge to the priorities of governments and to the
power of business, in particular transnational corporations and
their allies. The reliance of governments around the world on
economic solutions to environmental problems, for example
emissions trading for climate change, is not a reflection of the
accuracy or persuasiveness of the environmental economic
theories on which they are based, but rather an indication that
these solutions suit powerful interests of a business-managed
democracy (Beder 2010).
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